

Sectarianism as a Tool to Debilitate the Political and Social Situation in The State of Iraq

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Abstract

The violence which lasted to access sectarian identities has occurred at times during Iraq modern history, it was not a constant or normal state of events. Nevertheless, the historical observations for the Iraq modern history demonstrate the escalation in the sectarian violence, progressively. The continuing of sectarian separation and its socio-political increment within the regional troubles could represent the disastrous secret of current Iraqi society. This thesis study clarifies the roots, and motivators of sectarian violence through comparative analysis of literature, and questionnaire development among professionals. This thesis has identified three important events in the modern history of Iraq, considered by scholars and researchers as milestones of sectarianism and sectarian conflict. 'Failed State' theory has been adopted on those events to interpret the sectarianism causes and subsequent results, through transform sectarian tensions into sectarian violence due to the political, economic, and security vacuum. The thesis concluded by highlighting the following points; both, British occupation in the early of the twentieth century, and the occupation of the United States in the early of the twenty-first century were the root and motivators (respectively), for sectarianism in the modern history of Iraq. As a result of the inaccurate decision making by both occupiers because of their own state crises, Iraq has established and experienced state crises, weakness, and failure, throughout its modern history. This led to stimulating and escalating sectarian violence, and failed to prevent the identity division in the society, and prevent the escalate in sectarian salience due to the characteristic of failed state apparatus.

Keyword: Sectarianism, 'Failure State theory', National and Social Identity, Iraq,

'Modern History of Iraq'.

Introduction

Throughout last decades, sectarianism has become noticeably one of the key parts of political and social issues in the Middle East and beyond. The 'sectarianism' in Iraq has been coming from a discourse among Iraqis and non-Iraqis since the foundation of the Iraqi state, and it has rarely this discourse has been objective. The sectarian separation and its socio-political signs have been from numerous points of view the notorious potentially disastrous secret of current Iraqi society: an unquestionable certainty is known to everyone, but one which was rarely discussed beyond the limits of the single sect group.

The sectarian identity and sectarian relations have been forbidden subjects to be discussed along with the modern Iraqi history.

Nevertheless, since the 1970's, and especially since the Iranian revolution of 1979, sectarian characters have needed to persist external and internal crisis that has let sectarian identity remarkable and that eventually served to likely push the subject of 'sectarianism' into the public domain (Haddad, 2010).

1.1 The Study Purpose

The purpose of this study is to analysis the sectarianism as a tool to debilitate the political and social situation in the State of Iraq: The basic reasons and the subsequent results, hence the study appraisal and analysis of the followings;

Analyze the sectarian identity in Iraq as a religious and political identity since the establishment of the modern borders of the Iraqi state in the early of the twentieth century.

Delineate the role of colonizing countries especially Great Britain in motivating sectarian identity to be developed and reach the bloody conflict.

Identify and understand the social motivators that enhanced the sectarian identity.

Examine the influence of Iraqi society by sectarianism following the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003.

The Study Significant

This study significant is to provide an intelligible understanding about the roots of the sectarian conflict and its motivators in the modern history of Iraqi society, in order to get a comprehensive image about the future of Iraq as a state with its existing borders under the effect of this phenomenon.

Research Questions

The study tries to answer the following questions;

1. What is the main reason for the sectarian escalation in Iraq since its establishment in the beginning of the twentieth century?
2. What is the rule of state apparatus in the sectarianism motivation?
3. How British and American occupation in Iraq affected the sectarianism in this country?

1.4 Hypothesis of the study

If the 'State Failure' theory can interpret the sectarianism salience in Iraq, then the sectarianism is a result of 'State Crises' which artificially created in the beginning of the twentieth century by name of modern Iraq, on the not stable foundation.

2. Methodology

We have noted already the objective goals of the thesis and the contention that this study is planned to create. Initially, the literature review was conducted in order to survey the previous studies about sectarianism in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East to find a gap and add an original contribution to the subject.

2.1 Theoretical Analysis

Theoretical analysis will be conducted based on the books, library references, scholarly articles in peer-reviewed journals and credible internet sources. To answer the research question, a hypothesis of the concept of "State Failure" theory has been adopted as a possible explanation for the sectarianism salience. This hypothesis evaluated through adopting it on three events in the modern history of Iraq as case studies and the result have been discussed.

The study will analyze the effects of these events in the history of Iraq and how they were the key roles in the aggravation of the sectarian problem in Iraq, based on the theory of "State Failure". The author will use the term "State Crises" to elucidate the process of the state movement to fail.

2.2 Questionnaire

Qualitative and quantitative methods will be conducted through developing opened-end and closed-end questionnaire. A questionnaire applied among selected society sample participants (political party's members, researchers, University Lecturers, Journalists, historian) in order to assess the results that obtained from theoretical analysis about the adopted theory of "State Failure" to interpret three previous mentioned events. The questionnaire designed to evaluate the effect of "State Failure" theory on the sectarian salience in Iraq from the early of the twentieth century until now, in the view of the participants.

Thirty individuals were selected based on their experience and profession. The researcher tried as much as to neutralize the ideological tendency of the participant. So, the questionnaire forms have been distributed. Twenty-five forms return back with completed and credible answers, which could be involved in this thesis.

Literature Review

Many types of research previously announced in this field will be surveyed. The factors like; sectarianism and sectarian identity role in Iraq will be highlighted. Also, try to address the impact of significant events in Iraq on the salience of the sectarianism in Iraq.

3.1 Previous studies

To achieve a satisfactory comprehension of the fundamental thoughts, several types of research and studies for last ten years will be dissected and inspected to distinguish and assess basically. The literature review incorporates refereed journal articles, conference papers, dissertations, and theses. Marwa Wael Alkhairo, (2008) approached her research during the interview for more than '77' individuals living in the United States, as a part of a larger project to obtain the oral histories of migrated Iraqis to the United States. She asserted in her study that the majority of Iraqi interviewees blame the external forces that escalate sectarianism after 2003. In addition to that, she showed that most those Iraqis believe to unified Iraq and reject the sectarianism arguments and seek after a homegrown popularity-based government that spots Iraqi society as its fundamental need and neglect the Sectarianism, which leads to separation in the society.

Fanar Haddad (2010) in her research argued that sectarian identity in Iraq is characteristically connected to national identity and it is the variety of Iraqi nationalism instead of the absence of any of that made Iraqi national personality more complicated to be identified. Ethnic majority in Iraq is not, in itself, a challenge to the Iraqi country state or Iraqi patriotism; but, it is the disability of the state to rise above these divisions that have entangled what ought to be secondary identities. Jin, Yong Ki, (2010) in this study mentioned that the sectarianism or ethnoreligious conflict in Iraq is not created because of the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003 only. But, it is started from Since Iraq instituted in the early third decade of the twentieth century when Iraq established according to the benefit of the British authorities. The study asserts that the Iraqis were not encouraged to have one unified country like existing modern Iraq. The study searched the impact of ethnoreligious clashes in Iraq on the re-building procedure of the state since 2003.

This study hypothesized that the sectarian clashes affect badly the development of this country, based on the fact that every sectarian group care for its particular benefits which leads to segregate the unity of the society. The conclusion of the study demonstrated that the British mandate to Iraq was the beginning of ethnoreligious conflicts and pointing the beginning of sectarianism in Iraq. In addition to that the research address that the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, was also the complementary to escalate that sectarian conflict through giving the chance to United States to invade Iraq and start a new era of the colony, which escalate the ethnoreligious conflict among Iraqis.

Dina Rizk Khoury, (2010) mentioned in her research that the sectarianism of post-2003 Iraq can't be comprehended by exhuming its authentic starting points in late Ottoman, monarchical or early Ba'athist Iraq. She asserted also that, would not be able to be exclusively ascribed to the political plans made by the US-British occupation and their partners. Ryan Pavel, (2012) has argued that the purge and revenge post-Saddam regime, after the United State invasion of Iraq in 2003 like the process of 'De-Baathification' (purge and follow of Baath party members), had a big role to open the widest gate of sectarian retribution and make Iraq after 2003 more weak sociologically. This is because of the wrong politics of United States through the draft that Rumsfeld-advocated, Bremer-initiated, and applied by mean of Iraqi political characters. The research conducted several document sources for analyzing and comparing the findings.

3.2 State Failure Theory

This chapter will elucidate the concept of the 'State Failure' theory and its characteristics, as the most important effects of this concept on the social identity and sectarianism will be addressed, as the criticism to this theory will be discussed as well.

The Concept of "State Failure"

A State Failure is a political body condition that reaches a situation where basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government no longer function properly. In the same context, when a nation becomes weak and facing living standards declination, it faces the possibility of governmental collapse.

According to "Fund for Peace" (non-governmental, and non-profit research institution in belong to the United States), there are several characters to identify a failed state, which are; loss of sovereignty on its territory; disintegration of legitimate authority to take decisions collectively; failing in provide public services, and disability to deal with other states as a full member of the international community (Cojanu & Popescu, 2007). Despite that there is no agreement about the definition of 'State Failure', but the most accepted definition is; State failure occurs when "the basic functions of the state are no longer performed" (Zartman, 1995).

Table 5. Characteristics of strong and weak or failed states

Characteristic	Strong State	Weak / failed state
State monopoly on use of force	Exists	more or less absent
Sovereignty of state	High	Low
Quality of democracy	High	Low
The legitimacy of state and citizens' loyalty to it.	High	Low
Security	High	Low
State control of territory	Exists	more or less absent
State control of borders	Exists	more or less absent
Effectiveness of institutions, infrastructure, and bureaucracy	High	Low
Disposition of means of physical violence	Concentrated in the hand of the state and of persons authorized by it.	Illegally also in the hand of non—State players
Corruption and crime	Low	High or out of control
Legal order	Reliable	Unreliable and ineffective
Economy	Functioning	In more or less deep crisis
Demographic changes	Slight and under control	Considerable and out of control

Source: (Malek, 2006).

3.4 The Failure State Theory and prominence of Sectarianism

The state failure theory assumes that the rise of sectarian violence in many countries is the result of state weakness. Characteristics of a failed state are as mentioned previously; loss of sovereignty or control on its territory; the degradation of legitimate authority; failing in provide public services, and lack of economic stability, etc. In addition to that, the failure of the state governing bodies degrades the importance of a national identity, providing space for alternative identity groups to dominate.

Hence, in this part the author tries to emphasize on two subjects to be investigated in the framework of the 'Failure State' theory, which are;

The significance of the state apparatus.

The 'state failure' impact on the social identity, and how sectarian groups become more salient during times of state failure.

The thesis will use the term 'State Crises' instead of 'State Failure', in order to investigate the processes that lead to failure of states. Then, concludes based on the state failure hypothesis on fully explaining the rise in sectarian violence in Iraq.

Case Studies, Theoretical Analysis

As explained in chapter three, the most motivators for conflict and sectarianism salience appeared during the critical times in state's history or when the state might be under the impact of destabilization or transition to failure as per the concept of "State Failure" theory. This situation was present in the history of Iraq since established in the beginning of the twentieth century, as explained in chapter two. In this chapter (Chapter Four), the important events from the modern history of Iraq have been selected as case studies. These cases will be theoretically analyzed based on the theory of 'State Failure' to interpret the sectarianism roots and motivators in the modern history of Iraq.

First Case -The British occupation and its political behavior in Iraq

Modern Iraq has been constituted accordance with the British occupation benefit in the beginning of 1920s. It was difficult for Iraqis to accept that to be collected in one country as it is now. Because Iraq contains many religious groups, and many ethnic communities have their own histories and different languages (Shakir, 2014). Andreas, Wimmer (2003) asserted also, that the sectarianism or ethnoreligious conflict in Iraq is started from the beginning of the establishment of Iraq in the beginning of the twentieth century, by the British colonial authorities based on their benefits.

1920 witnessed the proclamation of a joint Sunni- Shi'a Revolt against the British. Accordingly, the British-bolstered Iraqi government started enormous extraditions of the Shi'a religious hierarchy in Iran, as the Ottoman Empire had done previously. In response, Shi'a scholars asked their followers not to join in the politics, a circumstance that persevered through an additional four decades (Nakash, 2003). In the meantime, the sectarian alliance was not really the principal focal point through which all segments of future Iraqi society assessed their disappointment from the state. Certainly, the government and the administration introduced under the British authority were in the majority Arab and Sunni, whereas, this part was constituted around 20% in the populace at the time (Bromley, 1994: 135). Faisal was crowned king on 23 Aug 1921; His reign lasted for twelve years, which characterized chiefly by its weakness, (Tripp, 2000:49). In July of 1927, the British authorities in Iraq said to King Faisal that it would be "recommending Iraq to be a member of the League of Nations in 1932." (Tripp, 2000:63). With the establishment of the monarchy in Iraq, the Sunnis began to restrain the Shi'a and the Kurds

regarding the Sunni occupied governmental issues. In that period, the Shi'a implemented series of uprisings with the help of the Shi'a scholars. The conflict among the Sunnis groups and the Shi'as ones was based on the neglecting of Sunnis to the Shi'a accomplice in the political life.

Second Case -the Invasion of Iraq by the United States of America and its Allies 2003

The Iraq war, known as the Third Gulf War, started in 2003. The United States led an invasion against Iraq under the target of rescuing Iraq from dictators. The intervention prompted the fast destruction of the Iraqi power and the seizure and judgment of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and hanging him later. The United States changed the regime of Iraq with this invasion. However, violence against U.S. troops and their allies quickly prompted anarchy between the guerrillas from one side and the new regime instituted by the United States and United States troops in another side (Carlisle, 2012).

The attack on Iraq in 2003 introduced another stage, defined by savage sectarian division, which strongly affected the spines on which the Iraqi patriotism community was constituted (Al-Qarawee, 2013). The way the political procedure that ought to have added to the development of the "new Iraq" after the invasion of Iraq by the United States of America, was overseen did not ease common doubts but instead heightened them.

After controlling Iraq by the United States and its allies, the Temporary Governing Council constituted. The Temporary Governing Council, which was framed in 2004 by the CPA, on the premise of communal quotas, did not legitimize the procedure among the Sunni populace, particularly without sorted out the Sunni initiative. Since the defiant disposition was predominant in Sunni ranges, a truly public representation of Sunnis in the political procedure had not been secured, as shown by the consequences of the January 2005 elections. During the referendum for the constitution in October 2005, the constitution was dismissed in each region populated by a Sunni lion's share, yet it picked up a larger part in Shi'a and Kurdish territories and in the aggregate vote (Al-Qarawee, 2013).

4. Analysis And Discussion

This chapter will demonstrate a questionnaire data were and interpreted the results by using DST like frequency, percentage, graphs, etc. This chapter shows the data that obtained from secondary sources that might enrich the theoretical analysis, which obtained through primary sources (books, scholars opinion, Researchers, credible articles, international reports, etc.). A questionnaire had been distributed among 30 political characters included (12 university's lecturer, 8 journalists, 4 civilian activists, and 6 politicians), the 25 forms were collected after ten days, directly from the respondents. This means 83% of the selected samples have been responded to the questionnaire properly. The difficulties to contact remaining people because of their travels abroad prevented the author to get the questionnaire answer.

The five remaining forms were belonging to three politicians and remaining two was belonging to two journalists.

5.1 Findings

Regarding the third question about the sectarian identity for the participants as examples of the Iraqi educated people, the result demonstrated that 24% of the participants are very proud of their Sect, and 48% are quite proud to that. Whereas, 20% of them are not very proud of their sect, and only 8% of the participants are not believing in their sect, as seen in Table 2.

Table 6: Table shows the answers of the participants about the importance of their sectarian identity

No	Question	Very Proud	Quite Proud	Not very Proud	Not at all proud	Number of Participants
iii	How proud are you of your Sect?	6	12	5	2	25

The above table shows that more than 70% of the participants proud of their sect, whereas only 28% of them not proud of it. This means almost three-quarter of the participants considers their sect as a significant issue. About the question regarding how the participants see Iraq as State according to existing situation nowadays, the answers came variable. The participants showed that only 8% of them believe in strong Iraq today, and 52% of them see that Iraq is a state in the crises. In the same context, 28% see that Iraq is weak today, and only 12% believed that Iraq is failed state. See Table '3';

Table 7: The answer to a questionnaire by the participants about their opinion on the strength of Iraq as a state today.

No	Question	Strong State	State in Crises	Weak State	Failed State	Number of Participants
iv	How do you see Iraq as State today?	2	13	7	3	25

It can be seen in a Table '3' addresses that very little people who are not exceeding 8% of the participants believed that Iraq is a strong country, whereas the majority who institute 82% believe that Iraq today facing problems or weak, and 12% from these majority see Iraq as a failed country. This means the radical opinions were in two answers; the first which 8% of the participants demonstrated their 'optimistic' opinion about strong Iraq and the second one showed their 'pessimistic' view by 12% when considered Iraq as a failed country. This indicates that even the radical opinions are tending to

the failed country more than a strong one. Commonly the question demonstrates that the participants generally are with the crises and weak state to define the existing situation of Iraq.

Regarding the first part of the fifth question, the answer about evaluating the sectarianism in Iraq today, the answers of the participants demonstrated that 100% of the participants admitted to the presence of the sectarianism in Iraq, as seen in Table '4', which gives the indicator that the sectarianism prevails phenomena in Iraq.

Table 8: The evaluation of sectarianism according to the participants' view

Question	Active	Not Active	Number of Participants
v- How you evaluate the sectarianism in Iraq?	25	--	25

As summarized in a table '5' in the context of answering second part from the fifth question, three explanations had been offered by the participants about the presence of sectarianism in Iraq. 44% has claimed that the absence of central and strong government led to this result. Another group with 36% returned that to the intervention of the regional and neighbor countries in the interior affairs of Iraq. Whereas, 20% the last group accused the previous government's repression politics against specific sectarian communities created a reaction from these communities after the collapse of the previous governments.

Table 9: The most important factors for increasing sectarianism in Iraq as per participants' opinions.

Question	Fist Opinion	Second Opinion	Third opinion
vb Explain the reason behind the sectarianism in Iraq	The absence of strong central government.	Interference of Neighbors and regional countries in Interior affairs.	The previous government's repression politics against specific sectarian communities.

The explanation of the participants refers generally to the failing of the previous or existing governments in ruling the state. This indicator is supporting the concept of ‘State Failure’ theory in interpreting the salience of sectarianism in modern Iraq.

The participants, regarding the effect of British occupation to Iraq in the beginning of the twentieth century on the salience of sectarianism, have answered the sixth question. The participants divided into two parts; 68% of them support the British occupation politics to motivate sectarianism. In time, 32% of the participants denied accusing British occupation to stimulate sectarianism in Iraq. See Table ‘6’.

Table 10: The answer of the participants about the active/ nonactive role of British occupancy to stimulate Sectarianism.

No	Question	Active	Not Active	Number of Participants
vi-a	How you evaluate the effect of British occupation politics in the beginning of the twentieth century on the sectarian issue in Iraq?	17	8	25

In answer to the second part of the sixth question, the majority which agreed to the role of British occupation to stimulate the sectarianism explained their opinion. They see that the British government neutralized Shi’a community (who are the majority) from the political arena, when they selected King Faisal, who is originally Sunni, and not from Iraq, but from ‘Hejaz’ to rule Iraq.

Another’ opinion was that the sectarianism was not very active until the Islamic revolution by ‘Khumainy’ in Iran in 1979, and institute the Shi’a polar in Iran front of Saudi Arabia as Sunni polar in the region. This led Iraq to become the conflicted arena because of its geographical position. See Table ‘7’.

Table 11. The opinion of Participants about the role of British government in stimulating sectarianism in Iraq at the beginning of the twentieth century

N	Question	First Opinion	Second Opinion
o		68%	32%
vi-b	Explain your opinion about the role of British Occupation in motivating the sectarianism in Iraq in the beginning	Neutralized Shi’a community (who are the majority) from the political arena, when they selected King Faisal, who is Sunni and not Iraqi.	The sectarianism didn’t start in British occupation period but stimulated after the Islamic revolution in Iran 1979, which made Iraq conflict arena, between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The respondents' explanation about the role of Britain in motivating sectarianism, tending commonly to accuse the British wrong politics in and decision making based on their benefits only. That resulted to establish a state with many crises in the beginning of its foundation, which finally reached to a failed state in the beginning of the twenty-first century.

The seventh question was about if the sectarianism was behind the Uprising of Iraq in 1991. The respondents answered positively by 56%, whereas 44% answered negatively as seen in Table '8'.

Table 12: The respondents answer about the uprising of 1991.

No	Question	Yes	No	Number of Participants
vii-a	Do you think the sectarianism motivators were behind the Uprising of Iraq in 1991 "Entifadha"?	14	11	25

The interpretation of each group, who they answered either by 'Yes' or 'No', was as follow; the respondents who answered by 'yes', claimed that the uprising had sectarian identity, because was a revenge of oppressed communities by Saddam Hussein regime (Shi'a and Kurds), whereas the Sunni communities were not involved in that uprising. The respondents who answered by 'No', had a different opinion, and they stated that the uprising was the reaction from defeated army against the wrong decisions of government that time. See Table '9'.

Table 13: The opinion of the respondents, regarding the reason behind the uprising of 1991.

No	Question	First Opinion	Second Opinion
		56%	44%
vii-b	Explain for the seventh question	A revenge of oppressed communities by Saddam Hussein regime (Shi'a and Kurds), whereas the Sunni communities were not involved in that uprising.	The reaction from defeated army against the wrong decisions of government that time.

Regardless the opinions of both sides from the respondents, both answers refer to the problem of state apparatus, either in its repression by the loyal group to the government to other groups in the community, or by the weakness or collapse of the state after the defeat of army or losing the sovereignty in the war. Both conditions refer again to the 'State Failure' concept in interpreting the motivation of sectarianism.

The eighth question in the questionnaire was regarding the relation between the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003 and the stimulation of Sectarianism after that. All the participants answered by 'Yes'. Means the respondents agreed 100% with the relation between Iraq invasion in 2003, and the violent conflict in 2006-2007 among sectarian groups in Iraq. See Table '10'.

Table 14: The answer of the participants regarding the relationship between sectarianism salience and the United States invasion in 2003.

No	Question	Yes	No	Number of Participants
viii- a	Is there any influence of the invasion of Iraq by U.S. troops in 2003 on the salience of sectarianism post-2003?	25	--	25

In next part of this question, the respondents asked to explain their point of view about their answer. The opinions divided into three parts; one opinion with 48% supposed that the invasion of Iraq let the state collapse and then the sectarian groups take the opportunity from this situation after long authoritarianism rule for many decades. This created the political gap during and after the invasion and gave opportunities to oppressed groups to revenge from regime groups.

Another opinion with 32% claimed that the irrational decisions and practices by the United States in Iraq resulted in anarchy and unbalance in the political situation and weakened the state. That led to make Iraq a suitable place for guerrillas and sectarian groups to conflict inside the country.

The last opinion with 20% addressed that the invasion of Iraq by the United States and removing the old regime by force to bring weak sectarian and ethnic parties to take control the apparatus of the state led to this conflict. See Table '11'.

Table 15: The opinion of participants regarding the relationship between sectarianism salience and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

No	Question	First Opinion	Second Opinion	Third opinion
		48%	32%	20%
viii-b	Explaining point of view regarding the relation between U.S. invasion of Iraq and sectarian conflict	State collapse due to the invasion led to sectarianism salience.	Irrational policies and practices for The United States during and after the invasion created anarchy and converted Iraq to be an arena for external conflicts.	Substitute the old regime by weak sectarian and ethnic parties made the state weak.

According to the previous table, the opinion of the participants was totally directed to accuse the United States and its inaccurate practices and wrong politics, which led to sectarian violence in Iraq. All the opinions refer to that the United State invasion resulted to collapse the state during the invasion and led to institute weak state post-2003. This indicates that the ‘State Failure’ theory interprets the sectarian violence in this country. The ninth question was about the assessment of the future political system in Iraqi based on the existing political issues after 2003. The most expected ruling system for future was a sectarian system by 44% of the respondents, whereas 32% expected ethno-religious ruling system. The third expected ruling system according to the participants was an authoritarian ruling system by 16%. The less expected ruling system according to the respondents was the liberal system with only 8%. See Table ‘12’.

Table 16: The expected future ruling system in Iraq by respondents.

No	Question	Sectarian	Ethno-religious	Liberal	Authoritarianism	Other	Number of Participants
ix	How you expect the future political (ruling) system in Iraqi based on the existing political issues after 2003?	11	8	2	4	--	25

The answer to the previous question shows that the majority of the respondents are not optimistic, for the political future of Iraq. This situation returns according to the author opinion, the respondents are expecting the continuation of state crises, which prepare a good ground for sectarianism to grow up.

The tenth question was the last one in the questionnaire form. The question was asking the participants about their opinion regarding the government in Iraq today, either or not it is the patriotic government. The answers came out with 72% support that the government is not quite a patriot, whereas the remaining 28% asserted that the government is a patriot but it is helpless, as seen in Table '13'.

Table 17: The opinions of the participants about the Iraqi government's patriotism

No	Question	Yes	No	Number of Participants
x	Is the government of Iraq considering a patriotic government?	18	7	25

Finally, the majority of the participants demonstrated that the government is not quite a patriot, and the minority shows that the government is a patriot. Means the government in the view of the majority of the participants is not free and not working as per the benefit of Iraq, but they are part of exterior agenda, which makes the country weaker and always in crises.

6.1 Conclusion

This thesis has tried to elucidate the salience of sectarian violence in modern Iraq history by evaluating three significant events in Iraq since the beginning of the twentieth century. By examining and adopting the 'State Failure' theory on these three events, in order to find a tangible explanation for the cause of sectarian roots and motivators in this country. These three events are; the British colonization of Iraq; the uprising of 1991; and the United States invasion in 2003. In this thesis, the author tried to use "Crises State" instead of "Failure State" to focus on the process of the state failing which starts from, state crises, and state weakness, to reach to State collapse.

Thus, the conclusion that can be drawn from these events analysis is that sectarianism has been created since the instituting of first government by British power and inauguration of King Faisal to rule Iraq in 23rd of August 1921 and isolating Shi'a as the majority of the Iraq population in participating the political life. Great Britain's strategic opinion for the challenges they faced in Iraq, and the solutions, was flawed. They had lack understanding, and unwillingness to resolve the political and social problems

in Iraq, which caused irrecoverable harm. This led to creating a nonlegitimate state, and therefore establish weak state according to the concept of 'Failed State'.

Regarding the second event which is the uprising of 1991, the state of Iraq, became a weak or semi-collapsed state, as a result of the withdrawal from Kuwait and military defeat that faced by the Iraqi regime. Due to the weakness of the state that led the regime demonstrated a brutally suppressing front of the revolutionists during the uprising, who were almost holding Shi'a sectarian identity (in Southern and middle part of Iraq). This practice caused to deepen the gap between the sects and motivate the sectarian violence conflict, and demonstrated another indicator of failing state practices by state apparatus, which known by "Genocides and Politicides", based on 'Failure State' theory as elucidated previously in chapter four. It is worthy to mention, that the repression practiced by Saddam Hussein regime to his oppositionists even before the uprising was in brutal and savage's ways.

The United State invasion of Iraq in 2003, led to state collapse condition in the state during the invasion and result in creating weak state post-2003. This weak state according to 'State Failure' theory is behind the sectarian violence conflict and identity division in the country later on. This happened because of poor understanding by the United State decision makers about the reality and needs of the Iraqi society. This behavior of The United States as the occupier is indeed similar to the British occupation political behavior during establishing Iraq in 1921. Hence, the irresponsible political decisions by the first occupier (Great Britain), and later on the second occupier (The United States), had the crystallized and motivate the sectarianism in Iraq.

Recommendation

As evident, Iraq's religious and ethnic makeup is complex and diverse. The country is home not only to different religious sects and a number of smaller religions, but it is also considerably divided along ethnic lines. Each of these different communities are destined to live together and therefore the only rational way forward is peaceful coexist.

The best way for this coexistence and for a lasting peace to materialize, however, is for each of the sides to recognize the rights of the others and to abandon the idea that one community alone should or can dominate the country. The latter has already been tried and it has proven to be disastrous for that country. History has proven that the use of military force within Iraq, and the domination of power by any one of the communities has brought nothing to Iraq but wars, misery, ethnic conflict and large-scale human rights violations.

The suggestion therefore is that, firstly, all of the ethnic, religious or different sects within Iraq should principally adopt the belief that force should not be used to resolve internal political problems. This is not only due to the fact that the use of arms has so far failed to bring a lasting peace to Iraq but Iraq's

neighbors all also have interests in Iraq. Iraq is located somewhat in the middle of three major regional powers which are Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. To add to the complexity within Iraq, each of these sides also attempt to advance their own interests within the country. It is thus necessary for Iraq's different political and sect leaders not to allow Iraq to become a playfield for regional and international players, and one way to prevent this is for the different communities to recognize each other's equal rights within the country. The ultimate questions, therefore, would be: how can Iraq's leaders, sects and politicians achieve that level of coexistence and equal recognition of each other's rights?

In answering that, it seems, each sect should be allowed to have a degree of autonomy in consultation and reciprocity with the other communities. This allows for each community to feel that it is in charge of its own destiny and that this destiny is not imposed upon it by the other sects. As stated, the idea of any one side controlling the country by the use of force has fundamentally failed, despite the loss of numerous lives and the destruction of villages, towns and even cities such as Mosul. It is therefore suggested that for a country such as Iraq, home to a diverse group of ethnicities and religious sects, the best way forward is first to abandon the use of arms in resolving internal problems within Iraq (and this should become a matter of principle) and secondly "self-rule" or more autonomy for the different communities within Iraq seems to be the best way forward to fit a diverse country such as Iraq. This allows each community to practice and advance its own characteristics in the best possible way that it wishes to without feelings that it is ruled by one of the other communities.

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